Notwithstanding the exclusion of ethnic Germans, the numbers of officially categorised Displaced Persons were staggering. By August 1944 there were 7.6 million foreign civilian labourers and prisoners of war working in Germany itself, comprising around 29% of the Reich's industrial labour force and 20% of the total labour force. 8 It has been estimated that towards the end of the war approximately 13.5 million foreigners worked in the German economy, and at least 12 million were forced labourers.
Around 11 million survived the war. There were also several hundred thousand foreigners who had been imported into German-controlled territories and more than a million forced labourers in the Todt
Organisation (a Third Reich civil and military engineering group), constructing coastal fortifications throughout Northern Europe and Southern France. 9 In addition, it has been estimated that in May 1945 up to 10% of the 7.8 million troops wearing German uniforms were nonGerman. 10 In all, there were approximately 12 million classifiable Displaced Persons in and around Europe at the conclusion of the war in Representations of the DPs in the immediate post-war period were uniformly negative. To the post-war Germans, the DPs were known as schlechte Ausländern (bad or dirty foreigners), and "held in the greatest contempt". To Allied military authorities, they were 'surplus population' and 'a nuisance': 'kriegies' (POWs), 'goddam DPs' and 'lousy Poles'. 12 Jewish DPs (and it was soon ordered that all Jewish survivors were to be categorized as DPs), who made up 20% of the immediate post-war refugee population, were described by US General George S. Patton Jr. in 1945 as "lower than animals". 13 They were all, however, the responsibility of the Allied authorities. I am a Ukrainian, 35 years old, born in the region of Poltava of laboring parents and now I am living with no fixed residence, in constant want, wandering like a homeless cur around Europehiding from the repatriation committees of the USSR, who want to send me "home". I do not want to go "home". There are hundreds of thousands of us who do not want to. They can come for us with loaded rifles, but we will put up a desperate resistance -for we prefer to die in a foreign land rather than go back to that "home". I put that word in quotation marks, for it is filled with horror, for it shows the unparalleled cynicism of the Soviet propaganda directed against us: the Bolsheviks have made for 100 nationalities one 27 Cohen, 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 136. 28 "Soviet home" and by that term they are building the terrible "prison of peoples", the so-called USSR.
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This feeling of "horror" in response to the USSR was exacerbated by the Soviet persecution of returnees. There was a general assumption in Soviet lands that all returnees, particularly POWs (but even forced labourers), had been collaborators of the Nazi regime and this led to "complicated, often crippled fates" for those forced to return. 31 Historian
Tony Judt has estimated that one in five Soviet returnees were either shot or deported to the Gulag. 32 Others were turned back at the border by state officials, while many DPs received letters from family members warning them not to travel home. Soviet officials suggested that loyalty to homelands had been softened by the safe and comfortable camp environment, where "they do not work hard and they are set in a special atmosphere which is not normal". 33 The Soviets alleged that the DPs were being "nourished" in the camps as "tools of aggression for foreign powers". 34 The forced repatriations by Allied military authorities ceased around the end of 1945 as it became apparent that large numbers of In this context, a specific DP collective identity, or community, failed to emerge in post-war Europe; instead, a sense of "reactive" diaspora and exile mission was established. 46 The DP camps, or "DP Municipalities", encouraged by UNRRA to have a form of self-sufficiency, were usually nationality specific and attempted to keep a (homogenous) national sensibility alive through schools, cultural activities, and national celebrations and commemoration days. 47 Historian Marian J. Rubchak has described the camps as "a matrix for cultural preservation, and even further development, in a relatively isolated environment". 48 The camps 44 Cited in Suzanne D. Rutland, 'Sanctuary for Whom? Jewish Victims and Nazi Perpetrators in became a training ground for community leaders and modeled a community building process to be used after resettlement. 49 As well as a reconstruction of nationality, then, the DP camps could also be said to have provided a construction of national sentiment in diaspora.
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The most obvious example of an emergent identity is that of the Jewish adventure and self-fulfillment", together with an individualized and collective agency (and developing professionalism) involved in overcoming "the arduous and sometimes hazardous nature" of their work.
They were usually reluctant to ascribe much agency to the DPs themselves, and there was little attempt to consult with the DPs about their future.
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DPs were described by sociologists and psychologists working with the international bodies as "apathetic" and "cantankerous". 55 In one report commissioned by the Welfare Division of UNRRA, a summary of "the psychology of Displaced Persons" used descriptors such as "[rude],
[crude] behaviour, aggressiveness and touchiness", "apathy", "phantasyridden" and "unreal" thinking, "jealousy", "recklessness", "deep despondencies", "hypochondrial complaining" and "mental misery". 56 Peter
Gatrell has argued that this sort of pathologising of the DPs also infantilized them, and justified all forms of external intervention. 57 Indeed, the UNRRA report suggested that the "tools of repair" were "simple Soviet citizens or those who refused to return to their now Soviet-occupied homelands.
The IRO (1946 IRO ( -1952 was formally charged with resettling the DPs and in the meantime, maintaining and protecting them in the same camp system set up by UNRRA (1943) (1944) (1945) (1946) . 68 The IRO became responsible for the 
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All these processes established the IRO as a politicised international bureaucracy, whose major preoccupation was the categorization of the "administrative fiction" of DP eligibility. 70 One of its main tasks was issuing Identity Cards verifying the holder as a "genuine refugee or displaced person" able to access emigration channels. 71 This work followed on from UNRRA's screening practices, and in fact the IRO launched a massive review of individual cases already evaluated under UNRRA due to widespread "discrepancies and incoherence". 72 The IRO Identity Cards certified a politically blameless past, safeguarded the holder from repatriation, guaranteed continued maintenance and enabled possible resettlement. 73 The screening process, while necessary, was not particularly stringent, even "superficial and in the eyes of some, 'corrupt'". The Eligibility Manual "made clear that the IRO was not particularly enthusiastic about screening for war criminals", and that a certain amount of untruthfulness was expected. 74 Historian David Cesarani has noted that that UNRRA and IRO screening was "so weak that, in reality, it was useful only for public relations purposes". 75 Even though 'Displaced Person' remained the official IRO term for all groups under its mandate, and eventuated as the historical signifier of the disparate groups in Europe, a subtle change had taken place regarding both terminology and eligibility for refugee status. 76 A DP could become a 'refugee' if, on refusing repatriation, he or she demonstrated a "valid objection" to such repatriation.
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'Political Refugees'
After June 1948, in the context of increasing anti-Soviet sentiment, the IRO's eligibility focus changed from "genuine" victims of Nazism to anticommunist "dissidents". 78 In this way, and with the stroke of a pen, all
Soviet citizen DPs and other unrepatriables became 'refugees' from communism, and indeed by the end of the 1940s the two categories of 'displaced persons' and 'refugees' merged into the official appellations 'political refugees' and 'stateless refugees'.
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The US-controlled IRO concentrated on an evaluation of individual 'dissidence', paving the way for a broader notion of refugees, one which privileged the individual over the state. 80 The ideal-type refugee was now assumed to have 'genuine' (democratic) political creeds as well as 'genuine' reasons to fear persecution. This post-war change to individual rather than group eligibility (except in the case of Jews, who were classed as eligible because they were Jews), with an emphasis on 'proof' and 'persecution,' led to an attempt by the United Nations to codify an international legal framework for refugees, incorporating a language of protection and individual human rights. 81 The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defined a refugee as a person who:
Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence … is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
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The Convention embodied the historical, geopolitical specificity of the DP experience as it applied only to people who became refugees as a result of events that occurred prior to 1 January 1951, and was obviously aimed at the DPs as Western-perceived victims of Communist state persecution.
Signatories even had the option of limiting their obligations to European refugees. 83 Academic Gil Loescher, an expert in international refugee policy, has noted that "the definition had the added advantage that it would serve ideological purposes by stigmatizing the fledgling Communist regimes as persecutors". 84 From being members of ethnic, religious and political groups, the refugees were now under pressure to present themselves to the IRO as individual "asylum seekers". 85 Daniel Cohen has identified a "new theatricality"
imposed by the IRO under this system, where the incentive of refugee status encouraged an overemphasized "presentation of self", such as the open expression of fear. In this way, "storytelling" became of primary importance in order to fit the Western vision and definition of individual political persecution. This "Cold War myopia" privileged the "political persecute", a "true" refugee, over the "false" "economic migrant". 86 In this way, the DPs were further homogenized, as they were reduced to a question of their Cold War identities.
It can be argued that the IRO's pressure on individuals to present themselves as 'political refugees' obviated any of the age-old economic motives those from Eastern Europe may have had for refusing repatriation and aspiring to resettlement in the West. 87 According to one IRO officer, motives of adventure and a tradition of economic migration applied to "most" of the DPs; others estimated that only 25% of the DPs in August 1948 were "genuine refugees" as set out by the IRO. In such cases, IRO policy was to reject only the few who were "naïve enough to admit that they are economic migrants". By 1948, then, the eligibility of DPs as both Displaced Persons and 'refugees' had morphed into the "selection, control and regimentation" of both the IRO and the international community on "muscle-gathering missions". 96 The DPs, who had earlier presented themselves to the IRO as Cold War 'political refugees', were now coerced into presenting themselves to fit recruiters' needs. For Canadian immigration authorities, intellectuals turned into lumberjacks, workers and farmers; for the United States, they became farmers and mechanics. In Australia, all DPs were re-categorized as 'labourers' and 'domestics', and required to complete a two year work contract.
As well as an emphasis on manual work skills, there was a strong 'racial' component in the international community's selections. The United Nations reported that "without openly declaring their unwillingness to accept Jewish immigrants, the various recruiting missions invariably reject all the Jewish candidates". 97 It has also been argued that non-Jewish, particularly Baltic DPs, were specifically recruited for British work schemes to stem the immigration of non-white Africans and Asians, due to the racially-based belief that European DPs were "of good human stock". In effect, then, the IRO, admittedly "hat in hand", presided over and administered a "labour-recruitment program on an international scale". 104 The Soviets alleged that "a real slave trade" was flourishing, with the IRO the "main purveyor of cheap labour for the capitalist countries", and even
The Times (London) was inclined to agree: "There is a whiff of the slave market in the invitations to DPs to enter most countries". 105 Some IRO leaders attacked this "skimming of the cream" and "embargo on brains" as ruinous, a denial of the organisation's humanitarian aims. 106 However, to the recruiting countries the refugees were "immense pools of manpower representing every known skill", and the IRO was soon dubbed by the press the "largest travel agency in human history". 107 Although the IRO was intermittently uncomfortable with facilitating the recruitment of mass labour, there was also a perception that labour would have a moralizing and rehabilitative effect on the DPs, negating the "evil
